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Abstract 
An overlapping generations model is set out in which monetary policy matters for 
distortionary taxes because unanticipated inflation has real wealth effects on households with 
nominal government debt. The model is used to study the tax burden under inflation and 
nominal GDP targeting. Nominal GDP targeting makes taxes less volatile than inflation 
targeting but raises average taxes. With a quadratic loss function, the expected tax burden is 
minimized with only indexed debt under inflation targeting, but with both indexed and 
nominal debt under nominal GDP targeting. Nominal GDP targeting lowers the tax burden 
relative to inflation targeting (except at very high indexation shares), but this conclusion 
hinges on risk aversion, productivity persistence and the loss function for the tax burden.   
Keywords: nominal GDP targeting, inflation targeting, government debt, tax burden. 
JEL classification: E52. 
1 Introduction 
Over the past few decades, monetary policy analysis in academia and central banks has 
focused mainly on New Keynesian models (see Woodford, 2003). In these models, monetary 
policy has the potential to raise social welfare by stabilizing inefficient price variations across 
firms that arise due to the presence of nominal rigidities. In practice, however, this is not the 
only channel through which monetary policy matters. Recent research has re-affirmed the 
importance of unanticipated changes in inflation for agents who enter into nominal contracts  
(see e.g. Doepke and Schneider, 2006).  The key mechanism in these models is that 
unanticipated inflation erodes the real value of nominal debt, leading to redistribution from 
lenders to borrowers. Even if prices are fully flexible, the choice of monetary policy regime is 
non-trivial in these circumstances. However, relatively little is known about the merits of 
inflation targeting and other policy regimes in this context.1 This paper investigates this issue 
by assessing the impact of nominal GDP targeting on the tax burden, as measured by the 
level and volatility of distortionary taxes faced by households.  
A model is presented in which monetary policy matters for taxes due to the fact that 
unanticipated inflation has real wealth effects. The model consists of overlapping generations 
who work, consume and save optimally over the life cycle. Saving consists of endogenous 
accumulation of physical capital, government debt and money. Taxes are distortionary 
because consumption expenditure is taxed at a proportional rate. The main mechanism in the 
                                                          
1 Exceptions include Meh, Rios-Rull and Terajima (2010), Koenig (2013) and Sheedy (2014). 
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model is that unanticipated inflation matters for the real debt burden of the government – and 
hence the path of distortionary taxes – because the government issues nominal debt.2 Since 
nominal GDP targeting leads to a countercyclical price level, the path of taxes differs under 
inflation and nominal GDP targeting.3 The main aim of this paper is to investigate 
numerically how the tax burden differs under inflation targeting and nominal GDP targeting 
due to the implications of these regimes for average taxes and tax volatility.  
The main findings are as follows. There are differences in both the level and volatility of  
taxes under inflation and nominal GDP targeting. Under nominal GDP targeting, taxes are 
higher on average but less volatile. In other words, taxes are smoothed more effectively under 
nominal GDP targeting, but at a higher average level. The higher level of taxes is driven by 
the fact that nominal GDP targeting implies a countercyclical price level. When the price 
level is countercyclical, bondholders are hit with surprise inflation at times when their income 
is low. Since risk-averse agents must be compensated for this increase in risk, average 
government borrowing costs are higher under nominal GDP targeting,4 which in turn raises 
the level of taxes needed to finance government expenditure. At the same time, taxes are less 
volatile under nominal GDP targeting (except at very high indexation shares). This is because 
if the price level is countercyclical, government liabilities are eroded (inflated) in real terms 
at times when tax revenue is low (high) due to falling (rising) output. As a result, tax rates 
need to vary less in response to output fluctuations under a nominal GDP targeting regime.   
When the tax burden is represented by a quadratic loss function, the impact of nominal GDP 
targeting on the expected tax burden depends on whether the mean effect (higher average 
taxes) outweighs the volatility effect (lower tax volatility). Under the baseline calibration, the 
expected tax burden is lower under nominal GDP targeting for a large range of indexation 
shares, because tax volatility is lowered sufficiently relative to inflation targeting to offset the 
impact of higher mean taxes. The exception occurs at indexation shares close to 100%, for 
which the expected tax burden becomes higher under nominal GDP targeting than inflation 
targeting. This is because tax volatility rises as the share of indexed debt is increased, 
eventually exceeding the level under inflation targeting at very high indexation shares. In 
addition, while the expected tax burden is minimized under inflation targeting by issuing only 
indexed debt, nominal GDP targeting minimizes the tax burden when nominal and indexed 
debt are issued.5 These conclusions are fairly robust, but sensitivity analysis indicates that the 
implications of nominal GDP targeting and inflation targeting for the tax burden depend 
crucially on risk aversion, productivity persistence and the assumed tax burden loss function. 
                                                          
2 In practice, most government debt is nominal. For instance, only around 25% of UK government debt is 
indexed debt (DMO, 2015). The equivalent figure in Canada is 8% (Department of Finance Canada, 2016), 
while in the US less 10% of government debt is indexed to inflation (US Treasury, 2016).   
3 Nominal GDP targeting is modelled as nominal GDP level targeting in the numerical analysis that follows. 
However, similar results are obtained for the case of nominal GDP growth targeting; see Section 5.4.  
4 The higher level of borrowing costs under nominal GDP targeting is shown by an increase in the inflation risk 
premium (see Bekaert and Wang, 2010 for survey). Here, the inflation risk premium is defined as the difference 
between the expected real returns on nominal and indexed debt. A formal definition is given in the Appendix. 
5 The ‘corner solution’ under inflation targeting is related to the fact that both mean and variance of taxes fall as 
the share of indexed debt is increased. This is overturned under nominal GDP targeting because the price level is 
countercyclical, which enables tax smoothing by issuing some nominal debt. Section 4 provides more detail. 
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In particular, high levels of risk aversion or productivity persistence overturn the result that 
nominal GDP targeting lowers the expected tax burden, as does a loss function which places 
a relatively low weight on tax volatility as compared to the case of a quadratic loss function. 
The paper is related to two main strands of literature. First, there is a past literature on 
nominal GDP targeting. Formal analyses include Bean (1983), Bradley and Jansen (1989) 
Hall and Mankiw (1993), and Jensen (2002), amongst others. These papers highlight 
circumstances in which nominal GDP targeting can be expected to raise social welfare.6  
More recently, Billi (2013) has shown that nominal GDP targeting may be beneficial in the 
presence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. A somewhat different issue is 
studied by Koenig (2013) and Sheedy (2014). They show that if private financial contracts 
are specified in nominal terms, nominal GDP targeting will redistribute income from 
borrowers to lenders. Due to this risk-sharing mechanism, nominal GDP targeting is able to 
replicate the efficient allocation that would result in the presence of complete financial 
markets. The analysis here contributes to the nominal contracting part of the literature by 
studying the implications of nominal GDP targeting for taxes. This contrasts with previous 
work in the literature, which has studied nominal GDP targeting in the presence of private 
nominal debt and wage contracts, but not government debt.7  
The paper is also related to literature on the redistributive effects of inflation through changes 
in the real value of nominal debt. In a seminal paper, Doepke and Schneider (2006a,b) show 
that US households have substantial net nominal positions and that the redistributive effects 
of unanticipated inflation through this channel are quantitatively significant. In particular, a 
moderate episode of unanticipated inflation implies substantial wealth losses for older agents, 
the main holders of government debt. 8 Similar results are shown for Canada in Meh and 
Terajima (2011) and for the Euro Area in Adam and Zhu (2015). Theoretical analyses of the 
redistributive effects of inflation through this channel include Champ and Freeman (1990), 
Doepke and Schnieder (2006c), and Meh, Rios-Rull and Terajima (2010). Like the present 
paper, these studies use an overlapping generations model. The novel feature here is that 
monetary policy affects average government borrowing costs – and hence average taxes – 
because the effects of inflation risk are taken into account. This is crucial since nominal GDP 
targeting raises inflation risk relative to inflation targeting, so that higher taxes are necessary 
to fund government expenditure.  
As noted by Doepke and Schneider (2006c) and Meh, Rios-Rull and Terajima (2010), a 
crucial issue that arises in the context of redistribution through unanticipated inflation is how 
                                                          
6 With the exception of Jensen (2002), these papers focus on nominal GDP level targeting (as here). Since no 
central bank has adopted this regime in practice, previous studies have been theory-based rather than empirical.   
7 Nominal wage contracts (resp. nominal debt contracts) are central in the results of Bean (1983), Bradley and 
Jansen (1989) (resp. Koenig (2013), Sheedy (2014)). None of these papers focus on government debt.   
8 Doepke and Schneider (2006a) report that, in the baseline year of 1989, the net nominal position in bonds of 
US households above the age of 56 ranged from 12.4 to 16.4 percent. Consequently, following a moderate 
episode of unanticipated inflation “a coalition of rich and old households loses, in present value terms, between 
5.7 and 15.2 percent of GDP” (p. 1071). In Doepke and Schneider (2006b), where the foreign sector is excluded, 
this is updated to: “A coalition of relatively old households loses between 7 and 18 percent of GDP.” (p. 500).    
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any windfalls (losses) are used (funded) by the government. In the model in this paper, 
government expenditure is exogenous, so windfalls accruing to the government when 
inflation is unexpectedly high are partly redistributed back to households via lower taxes. The 
assumption that taxes and government debt take the burden of adjustment following shocks is 
sensible for a long run analysis (as here) for two reasons. First, both total government outlays 
(which includes debt interest repayments) and total tax revenue have been rather volatile over 
time as a share of GDP, whereas government expenditure has been more stable.9 Second, it is 
difficult to gain political support for sustained changes in government expenditure, so 
economists have been active in investigating other mechanisms open to fiscal policymakers.10  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
provides a description of monetary policy under inflation and nominal GDP targeting. In 
Section 4, the model is calibrated and the main results are reported. This is followed by a 
discussion of robustness and sensitivity analysis in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.   
2 Model  
The model is a version of Diamond’s (1965) overlapping generations model where the young 
save for old age using capital and government bonds. It contains three sectors: a household 
sector which saves and supplies labour; a government sector which issues debt, levies taxes 
and spends; and a firm sector which produces output using capital and labour.11 This section 
describes each sector, the competitive equilibrium, and how the tax burden is measured. 
2.1 Households 
The model consists of a small open economy with an infinitely-lived government and 
overlapping generations of representative households (of size 1) that live for two periods. 
Consumption when young (old) is denoted c1 (c2). Each generation supplies labour, l, when 
young. Consumption is taxed at rate τc. When young, agents consume out of their labour 
income w.l and save in capital, k (which depreciates fully within a period); nominal 
government bonds, bn; indexed government bonds, bi; and real money balances, m.12 When 
old, agents retire and consume their remaining wealth, leaving no bequests.  
Capital earns a risky real return rk. Nominal bonds pay a riskless gross nominal interest rate R 
on maturity. The ex post real return on nominal bonds is given by rt+1,n = Rt/Πt+1, where  
Πt+1 ≡ Pt+1/Pt is inflation, and Pt is the aggregate price level. Indexed bonds pay a riskless real 
return rf which coincides, due to arbitrage, with the constant world real interest rate, r*.
13 
                                                          
9 This is related to the fact that the expenditure shares of consumption and investment have been fairly stable. 
See e.g. the World Bank database at: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. 
10 For instance, Aizenman and Marion (2011) assess the option of using inflation to erode the US government 
debt. There is also a substantial normative literature on optimal taxation in which government expenditure is 
typically treated as exogenous (see Ljungqvist and Sargent, Chapter 12).   
11 In Diamond (1965), labour supply is inelastic. Endogenous labour supply is considered here since this channel 
will affect the response of output to shocks, which is potentially important given that nominal GDP targeting 
responds explicitly to fluctuations in real GDP.  
12 The assumption of full depreciation of capital is reasonable as each period is interpreted as lasting 30 years. 
13 Demand for bonds is fully satisfied by the government. This assumption does not affect the conclusions.  
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Money pays a real return rm
  = 1/Π. Following Artus (1995), demand for money arises from 
the requirement that money holdings be at least a fraction θ of consumption expenditure by 
the young, so that mt ≤ θ(1+τc,t)c1,t. Taxes enter here because consumption is taxed at rate τc. 
The above constraint will hold with equality if Rt > 1 for all t, which is assumed to hold.
14 
Hence we have that 
           ,)1( ,1, ttct cm    t                 (1)  
The nominal money supply in period t is denoted Mt and follows a fixed rule. Changes in the 
money stock are accomplished by lump-sum money transfers to the old of St = Mt – Mt-1, 
which are taken as given by households.  Real money balances in period t are given by  
mt = Mt/Pt. The real money transfer received by the old is defined as st = St/Pt. 
A young agent born at date t solves the following problem: 
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14 This condition is derived in Section A of the Supplementary Appendix and was satisfied in all numerical 
simulations reported in this paper. Crettez, Michel and Wigniolle (1999) survey the ways money has been 
introduced in overlapping generations models. Money in the utility function has similar results (see Section 5.1). 
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2.2 Firms 
The production sector consists of a representative firm that produces output using a Cobb-
Douglas production function: y = Akαl1–α. The capital income share in output is equal to α and 
the labour share is 1–α. The firm hires capital and labour in competitive markets to maximise 
current period profits. Total factor productivity, A, is stochastic and follows an AR(1) in logs:  
ln(At) = ρA ln(At-1) + et  
where et  is an IID-normal innovation with mean zero and standard deviation σe.   
The real wage and the return on capital are given by  
  )/()1( tttt lkAw                                 (9) 
 1, )/(/
  tttttkt lkAkyr                   (10) 
2.3 Government 
The government issues debt in the amount demanded by households and sets consumption 
taxes τc to cover fixed expenditure g* > 0 plus interest payments on debt net of new 
issuance.15 The government budget constraint is given by:16  
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where b = bn + bi is total government debt issued and v ≡ bi/b is the share of indexed debt.   
In what follows, we consider equilibria where the share of indexed debt is held constant. 
Hence, the supply of nominal debt is given by (1 – v)bt, and the supply of indexed debt is vbt, 
as in Hatcher (2014). Given this portfolio allocation, the total demand for government debt is 
determined endogenously by the first-order conditions. The supply of government debt is set 
equal to this demand, which ensures market-clearing for each type of debt.   
2.4 Equilibrium 
Since capital depreciates fully within a period, investment in period is given by it = kt+1.  
Definition of equilibrium:17 
A set of allocations and prices  ttftttcstdtttsntdntsitditttt PMrRmmlkbbbbcc ,,,,,,, ,,,,,, ,,,,,,,,2,10   
with the following properties: 
                                                          
15 The key assumption is that government expenditure is exogenous. Since government expenditure fluctuations 
do not add any insights, g is held fixed in order to reduce the number of parameters and shocks in the model. 
16 Note that the money supply does not appear in the government budget constraint because changes in the 
money stock finance lump-sum transfers to the old.      
17 Note that d and s superscripts are introduced in this section to denote demand and supply values. These 
superscripts are omitted in other sections of the paper in order to reduce on notation.  
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(3) The government budget constraint, (11), holds and the share of indexed debt v is constant; 
(4) Factors of production are paid their marginal products, (9) and (10), and the real interest 
rate on indexed bonds equals the constant world interest rate r*; 
 
(5) The cash constraint on money holdings, (1), holds with equality: ttct cm ,1, )1(   ;  
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2.5 Measuring the tax burden 
To measure the tax burden, an ad hoc quadratic loss function is considered. In particular, it 
assumed that the period loss function is TBt = (τc,t /τc)2, where τc is the steady-state 
consumption tax rate.18 Since the loss will vary over time with shocks that hit the economy, 
the numerical analysis below focuses on the long run average tax burden by calculating the 
unconditional expectation of the period loss, E[TB]. We consider a quadratic loss function 
because it penalises both higher taxes and tax volatility.19 In particular, an increase in mean 
taxes will raise the expected tax burden, as will a mean-preserving increase in tax volatility.   
Formally, the burden-minimising debt share solves the problem: 
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The debt share that solves the above problem is computed numerically. To do so, the model 
was solved using a second-order approximation in Dynare (see Adjemian et al., 2011). In 
                                                          
18 Dividing by the steady-state tax burden, (τc)2, gives the tax burden a meaningful interpretation since it is 
measured relative to its constant steady-state value.     
19 Tax volatility matters when taxes are distortionary (as here). In particular, if tax distortions increase at the 
margin as taxes rise, then it is optimal, under certain circumstances, to keep taxes constant. This the ‘tax-
smoothing’ motive identified by Barro (1979).    
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particular, the unconditional expectation of the tax burden was computed for a large number 
of discrete debt shares in the interval [0,1] by looping over the parameter v in small steps. 
To understand the numerical results that follow, it is instructive to consider a second-order 
approximation of the expected tax burden around the point τc,t = E[τc,t]:20       
 

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      ])/[(][ ,2
2
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c
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
                                                                      (13) 
This expression shows that the expected tax burden increases with both mean taxes and tax 
volatility. These moments are therefore reported in the numerical analysis that follows. In 
addition, the decomposition of Equation (13) into a mean effect and a volatility effect is used 
to shed light on the relative importance of these two components for the tax burden.    
3 Monetary policy 
Money market clearing requires that Mt = Pt mt, where mt is given by Equation (1). Hence, 
inflation is Πt = Pt / Pt-1 = (Mt/ Mt-1).(mt-1/ mt). However, the central bank has only imperfect 
control of the price level because the money supply is subject to a control error exp(εt), where 
εt is IID-normal with mean zero and standard deviation σε.21 Due to these money supply 
shocks, the central bank will not exactly meet its target for inflation or nominal GDP. 
Under inflation targeting, ‘bygones are bygones’ so the nominal money supply evolves 
according to the following rule: 
)exp()/( 1
*
1 tttttt mmMM                                                                                  (14) 
where *
t  is the desired inflation rate. 
The desired inflation rate is given by the inflation target, Π*. Hence, by Equation (14) and 
money market clearing, inflation is given by   
   )exp(* t
IT
t                     (15) 
Notice that inflation would be exactly equal to target in the absence of money supply shocks. 
By contrast, level targeting regimes call for past deviations from target to be offset in the next 
period. As a result, the money supply rule under nominal GDP (level) targeting includes both 
the current control error and a response to undo the past control error exp(εt-1): 
   )exp(/)exp()/)(/( 11
*
1
*
1  tttttttt mmPPMM                                                      (16) 
where P* is the desired price level so that the nominal GDP target would be met each period.    
                                                          
20 Note that the middle term in the second-order expansion drops out because E[τc,t – E[τc,t]] = 0.   
21 As discussed in Section 5.3, adding persistence in money supply shocks does not add any additional insights. 
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The desired price level Pt
* satisfies Pt
* yt = (Py*)t, where (Py*)t = [Π*(1+Δy*)]t is the nominal 
GDP level target in period t, and target output growth is assumed to be zero (i.e. Δy* = 0).22 
As a result, desired inflation is (yt-1/ yt).(Py*)t /(Py*)t-1= Π*yt-1/ yt. Hence, by Equation (16) 
and money market clearing, inflation under nominal GDP targeting is given by:23 
   )exp(/)exp(]/[* 11  tttt
NGDP
t yy                  (17) 
Nominal GDP targeting implies a countercyclical price level: it makes the price level and 
output negatively correlated. By contrast, there is no relationship between the price level and 
output under inflation targeting, so that the only source of inflation risk is the control error εt.  
The inflation variances under the two regimes are related as follows: 
 
 2,11 )(lnvar)(lnvar NGDPy
IT
tt
NGDP
tt                   (18) 
where the second term on the right hand side is the conditional variance of log output under 
nominal GDP targeting.  
Intuitively, inflation is more volatile under nominal GDP targeting because it responds to 
fluctuations in output, which are primarily driven by productivity shocks. In the numerical 
analysis that follows, it is shown that this relationship between productivity shocks and 
inflation variations has implications for both the level and variability of distortionary taxes.  
4 Results 
The model was solved using a second-order perturbation in Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011). 
The tax burden-minimizing indexation share was computed as described in Section 2.5. This 
section describes the baseline calibration and steady-state before turning to the main results.  
4.1 Calibration and model solution 
4.1.1 Calibration 
The model is calibrated for the UK economy. In particular, the parameters of the model are 
chosen to roughly match key ratios in the data. Since these ratios depend upon several 
different parameters, the calibration uses parameter values which are plausible and give good 
overall performance against target ratios.24 For the purpose of calibration, each period in the 
model is assumed to last 30 years. The baseline calibration is listed in Table 1. 
The parameter α was set at 0.30, implying a share of capital income in GDP of 30% and a 
labour income share of 70%, which is fairly standard. The private discount factor β is set 
                                                          
22 It is assumed, without loss of generality, that the initial nominal GDP target, (Py*)0, is equal to one.   
23 The response of inflation to the lagged policy error εt-1 reflects the fact that past deviations from the nominal 
GDP target are offset under nominal GDP level targeting. Under nominal GDP growth targeting there is no 
response to the lagged policy error but very similar results are obtained; see Section 5.4.  
24 In some models, key ratios can be pinned down by a single parameter so that calibrated values can be set to 
match target ratios exactly. The model here does not have this property. 
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equal to 0.65, which is equivalent to an annual value of 0.979 under the assumption that each 
period lasts 30 years.25 The coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, is set equal to 2, which is a 
standard value that lies between the calibrations used in the business cycle and asset pricing 
literatures. The inverse Frisch elasticity η was set equal to 3, which lies in the mid-range of 
estimates used by the Congressional Budget Office of the United States (see Reichling and 
Whalen, 2012). The parameter θ was set at 0.10. This implies that the demand for real money 
balances is 10% of consumption when young, which helps the model to get close to the UK 
ratio of notes and coins to GDP of 3% (see Fish and Whymark, 2015).   
Table 1 – Baseline calibrated values 
Parameter Value 
Capital share in output, α  
Private discount factor, β 
Coef. of relative risk aversion, γ 
Inverse Frisch elasticity, η 
Cash constraint parameter, θ 
Trend inflation, Π* 
World real interest rate, r* 
Real government expenditure, g* 
Share of indexed debt, v 
Productivity persistence, ρA 
Std.(prod. innov.), σe 
Std.(money innov.), σε 
0.30 
0.65 
2 
3 
0.10 
1.81 
1.9 
0.14 
0.25 
0.50 
0.05 
0.05 
 
Trend inflation is set at Π* = 1.81. This amounts to annual inflation of 2% a year, consistent 
with the UK inflation target for the Consumer Prices Index (CPI). The world real interest rate 
r* is set at 1.9, which implies an annualised real interest rate of 2.2%. This is set slightly 
below the average UK estimate of 2.9% from 1965 to 2005 (see Mills, 2008), because 
matching a real rate this high would give an investment-GDP ratio somewhat lower than in 
the data (see Table 2). Given the trend inflation rate of 2% per annum, the implied nominal 
interest rate is 4.2% per annum. The parameter g* was set at 0.14 because, in conjunction 
with the other parameters, this gives a government expenditure share of around 20 per cent, 
which is similar to the ratio in UK data over the past decade.26 For the purpose of calibration, 
the share of indexed government debt, v, was set at 0.25, which matches the current UK share 
of 25% reported in DMO (2015). The indexation share has no impact on deterministic steady-
state but does affect the stochastic steady state and expected tax burden.    
The parameter ρA was set at 0.50 since there is no convincing evidence that productivity is 
persistent over generational horizons, as noted by Olovsson (2010, Footnote 21). The 
productivity innovation standard deviation was set at σe = 0.05, which is similar to the 
                                                          
25 In sensitivity analysis, alternative values of 0.45 and 0.85 are considered. 
26 See the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank. The expenditure shares reported in 
Table 2 are all taken from this database.  
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calibration in Hatcher (2014) in an overlapping generations model where each period is 20 
years. The standard deviation of the money supply innovation was also set at σε = 0.05. With 
this calibration, the standard deviation of inflation is 9%, whereas the 20-year standard 
deviation of UK inflation from 1988 to 2015 is 7%, based on overlapping 20-year sections of 
the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS).27  
4.1.2 Model solution 
Table 2 reports the deterministic and stochastic steady states of the model under the baseline 
calibration and inflation targeting. The model does fairly well against target ratios. The 
consumption expenditure share is 0.65, the investment share is 0.16, and the government 
expenditure share is 0.19. These values are close to the average national expenditure shares in 
the UK over the years 2004-2014 in World Bank data (see Table 2, Column 3).  The tax 
revenue target was set at 0.26 based on the average ratio of tax revenue to GDP in the UK 
over the period 2004-2013 in World Bank data. The calibrated model matches this target.  
For government debt, the target ratio was set at 0.11, which matches the ratio of long-term 
debt to GDP implied by ONS and DMO data.28 On this score, the model gives a ratio to GDP 
of 0.08. Hence, the model undershoots the target ratio for government debt somewhat, albeit 
that the difference is not dramatic. Finally, the calibrated model slightly overshoots the target 
ratio of currency to GDP. As discussed below, money plays an important role in the results.29  
Table 2 – Model solution versus key ratios (baseline calibration) 
Model ratio Definition in data Target Deterministic  Stochastic  Notes 
ycc /)( 21   Consumption/GNE 0.63 0.65 0.65 UK data: WB 
yi /  Investment/GNE 0.17 0.16 0.16 UK data: WB 
yg /  Govt. Expenditure/GNE 0.20 0.19 0.19 UK data: WB 
yccc /)( 21   Tax Revenue/GDP 0.26 0.26 0.26 UK data: WB 
yb /  Long-Term  
Govt. Debt/GDP 
0.11 0.08 0.08 UK data:  
ONS and DMO 
ym /  Notes and Coins/GDP 0.03 0.04 0.04 UK data: ONS 
     Notes: ONS = Office National Statistics; WB = World Bank; DMO = Debt Management Office. 
Consistent with the findings from the long run empirical literature on the effect of inflation 
on real variables, changes in the steady-state money supply growth rate (and trend inflation) 
                                                          
27 Twenty-year sections were used for calibration in order to increase the number of data points available. 
28 The debt-GDP ratio averaged 48% from 2000-2009 (World Bank) and over the same period the average share 
of long-term nominal government debt was 22% (see DMO, 2015). Combining these two figures gives the 
target debt-GDP ratio of 11% of GDP.  The DMO classifies gilts as ‘long-term’ if maturity exceeds 15 years. 
29 The author is grateful to a referee for pointing out the importance of moving away from a ‘cashless economy’. 
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have a very small quantitative impact on real variables.30 In particular, an increase in the 
steady-state inflation rate slightly lowers the demand for real money balances, the capital 
stock and labour supply (and hence output), but marginally raises government debt and taxes.  
Impulse responses to productivity and money supply shocks are reported in Section B of the 
Supplementary Appendix. A positive productivity shock raises output, along with 
consumption when young and old due to the positive income effect. Consequently, the tax 
base (=aggregate consumption) is rising, so that the tax rate can be lowered whilst 
maintaining government expenditure. This is exactly what happens under inflation targeting. 
However, under nominal GDP targeting, taxes respond less. In particular, because an increase 
in output requires below-target inflation in order to meet the nominal GDP target, the real 
debt burden of the government rises. Since a rise in the tax base now coincides with an 
increase in government liabilities, the reduction in taxes needed to maintain government 
expenditure is smaller than under inflation targeting. Similarly, a negative productivity shock 
raises taxes less under nominal GDP targeting than it does under inflation targeting.    
A positive money supply shock raises inflation on impact, lowering the real value of nominal 
debt held by the old. This lowers consumption by the old. At the same time, the tax rate falls 
due to the reduction in government liabilities. Due to the fall in the tax rate, consumption by 
the young rises, as does saving in capital and bonds.  The induced saving is larger under 
inflation targeting because expected future inflation is equal to the inflation target, so that the 
expected real return on nominal debt is stable. By contrast nominal GDP targeting creates the 
expectation of below-target inflation in the future, which makes saving through money 
relatively more attractive.31 However, the larger response of government debt under inflation 
targeting hinges on the relatively low share of indexed debt under the baseline calibration. 
Government debt and capital respond by more under nominal GDP targeting once most debt 
is indexed because there is then substitution from capital and bonds to money. The additional 
volatility of debt under nominal GDP targeting is important for understanding how inflation 
and nominal GDP targeting compare at high indexation shares, as discussed below. 
4.2 Baseline results 
The model was solved using a second-order perturbation in Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2011) to 
obtain approximate theoretical moments. The debt share that minimises the expected tax 
burden was computed as described in Section 2.5. As described there, the expected tax 
burden is calculated relative to its deterministic steady state value, (τc)2, which is identical 
under inflation and nominal GDP targeting and constant as the indexation share is varied.   
Figure 1 reports the expected tax burden under inflation and nominal GDP targeting and how 
it changes as the share of indexed debt is varied from 0 to 1 (i.e. 0-100%). Figure 2 provides 
                                                          
30 Bullard and Keating (1995) found that inflation has little or no long run effect on output in a large sample of 
developed and developing countries. Similarly, Crosby and Otto (2000) conclude that inflation has no long run 
impact on the capital stock. Sidrauski (1967) developed a model consistent with this finding.   
31 Inflation undershoots the inflation target in later periods in order restore nominal GDP to its target path. This 
requires offsetting the initial impact on inflation and lowering inflation below target when output is increasing.   
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further detail by decomposing the expected tax burden into mean and volatility effects (see 
Equation (13)), while Figure 3 highlights the role of key variables that drive the results.   
 
Fig 1 – Expected tax burden and indexation. Figure plots E[TB] as share of indexed debt varies from 0 to 1.  
 
 
 
Fig 2 – Decomposition of expected tax burden into mean and volatility effect.  Figure plots the mean effect 
and the volatility effect as the share of indexed debt is varied from 0 to 1. The sum of the mean and volatility 
effects equals expected tax burden plotted in Fig 1. 
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Fig 3 – Real variables and indexation. Figure plots the unconditional moments of variables under inflation 
targeting and nominal GDP targeting as the share of indexed debt is varied from 0 to 1. 
4.2.1 Inflation targeting 
Under inflation targeting the expected tax burden falls as the share of indexed debt is 
increased. This monotonic relationship stems from the fact that both mean taxes and tax 
volatility decline as the indexation share is increased (see Figure 2). Mean taxes fall because 
there is a positive inflation risk premium (see Figure 3, bottom row), so that nominal debt is 
more costly to repay than indexed debt and therefore requires higher average taxes in order to 
maintain the same level of government expenditure. Issuing more indexed debt allows the 
government to avoid this cost. In addition to this, issuance of indexed debt lowers the 
inflation risk premium itself because it means that a smaller fraction of asset portfolios is 
exposed to inflation risk, so that less risk compensation is demanded by households.32   
The volatility of taxes falls as the share of indexed debt is increased because the real return 
on nominal debt is volatile due to inflation risk (see Figure 3, top row), unlike the real return 
on indexed debt. As the indexation share is increased, the real debt burden of the government 
becomes more stable, so that less variation in the tax rate is necessary in order to fund 
government expenditure. This has the knock-on effect of making expected lifetime 
                                                          
32 Under inflation targeting, the inflation risk premium falls as the share of indexed debt is increased and is zero 
when only indexed debt is issued. The Appendix derives an expression for the inflation risk premium and 
explains this result in detail.   
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consumption growth more stable, so that the demand for government debt becomes slightly 
less volatile as indexation is increased (see Figure 3, second row). This contrasts with the 
case of nominal GDP targeting and is important for understanding the results that follow.   
The results in Figure 1 show that the expected tax burden is higher under inflation targeting 
than nominal GDP targeting for the large majority of indexation shares. The exception is at 
very high shares of indexed debt. In particular, inflation targeting gives a lower expected tax 
burden than nominal GDP targeting when the share of indexed debt is 98.4% or higher.33  
4.2.2. Nominal GDP targeting 
Under nominal GDP targeting, the relationship between the expected tax burden and the 
indexation share is not monotonic as under inflation targeting. The expected tax burden 
initially falls as the share of indexed debt is increased, but there are sharp increases in the tax 
burden after a minimum value is reached. The indexation share that minimizes the expected 
tax burden is 69.4% under the baseline calibration (see Figure 1). Hence, in order to minimize 
the expected tax burden, around one-third of government debt should be nominal and around 
two-third indexed, under a nominal GDP targeting regime. This is in stark contrast to 
inflation targeting, where the expected tax burden is minimized by issuing only indexed debt.  
This difference in results can be understood in terms of the mean and volatility effects (see 
Figure 2). As under inflation targeting, mean taxes fall as the share of indexed debt is 
increased because the government avoids paying the inflation risk premium (see Figure 3, 
bottom row). However, mean taxes are higher under nominal GDP targeting. The reason is 
that nominal GDP targeting makes the price level countercyclical. As a result, the old are hit 
with unanticipated inflation at times when income is low. This exacerbates falls in 
consumption in response to negative productivity shocks, and therefore raises marginal utility 
in bad states. Since households require compensation for this increase in risk, mean nominal 
interest rates rise relative to inflation targeting, raising the expected real return payable on 
nominal debt (top row, Figure 3), and with it the inflation risk premium.34 Consequently, 
repaying nominal debt is more costly under nominal GDP targeting, and mean taxes are 
higher. If only this effect were present, nominal GDP targeting would unambiguously raise 
the tax burden relative to inflation targeting. This conclusion applies even if only indexed 
debt is issued. In that corner case, debt will not be more expensive to repay under nominal 
GDP targeting (because no nominal debt is actually issued) but taxes nevertheless remain 
higher because government debt is slightly higher on average (see Figure 3, second row). 
In fact, however, the expected tax burden is lower under nominal GDP targeting, unless very 
high indexation shares are reached (see Figure 1). The reason is that the volatility of taxes is 
minimized when only nominal debt is issued, and this difference in volatility is enough to 
partially offset the effect of higher average taxes. With the mean and volatility effects going 
                                                          
33 The exact point of intersection depends on the parameterization of the model, as shown in Section 5.3. 
34 The inflation risk premium falls as the share of indexed debt is increased (as under inflation targeting) but 
remains positive under full indexation of government debt (in contrast to inflation targeting). The Appendix 
explains the reasons for this difference.  
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in opposite directions under a nominal GDP targeting regime, the net result is that the 
expected tax burden is minimized at an interior indexation share. The fact that this occurs at 
an indexation share of 69.4% indicates that the volatility effect contributes substantially to the 
overall tax burden. Indeed, for indexation shares below 75% the volatility of taxes is lowered 
under nominal GDP targeting by more than one-tenth (see Figure 2). However, as the share 
of indexed debt is increased, the volatility of taxes rises sharply and it eventually overtakes 
that under inflation targeting at an indexation share close to 100%.  
The relatively low volatility of taxes under nominal GDP targeting is due to the mechanism 
described in Section 4.1.2: in response to productivity shocks, the central bank responds by 
moving inflation in the opposite direction, so that the price level is countercyclical. As a 
result, the real debt burden faced by the government falls in periods when output is low and 
rises in periods when output is high. Because the tax base (= aggregate consumption) also 
falls when output is low and rises when output is high, the presence of a countercyclical price 
level ensures that the tax base and debt repayments move in tandem. Consequently, smaller 
movements in the tax rate are necessary to maintain government expenditure in the face of 
productivity shocks. The above description brings out the importance of productivity shocks 
for lower tax volatility under nominal GDP targeting. Indeed, reducing the volatility of 
productivity innovations relative to the volatility of money supply shocks closes the gap 
between tax volatility under inflation and nominal GDP targeting and thus raises the 
indexation share at which the expected tax burden is minimized (see Section 5.4).      
It should also be noted that the presence of money and interaction between government debt 
and money plays an important role in the results. In particular, if money were absent (the case 
where θ = 0), then the expected tax burden under nominal GDP targeting would be lower for 
all interior indexation shares and exactly equal at the corner solution where all debt is 
indexed. Similarly, increasing real money holdings by raising θ will increase the range of 
indexation shares for which the expected tax burden is lower under inflation targeting, albeit 
that this still only occurs at indexation shares close to 100% (see Section 5.3). The result that 
nominal GDP targeting raises the expected tax burden at high indexation shares is driven by 
the fact that government debt volatility rises sharply as indexation is increased and eventually 
overtakes the level under inflation targeting (see second row, Figure 3). This channel is 
entirely absent in an economy without money.  
The additional volatility comes from the fact that inflation risk is higher under nominal GDP 
targeting due to the need to respond to fluctuations in real GDP and past money supply 
shocks (see Equations (17) and (18)). In particular, with inflation being more volatile in 
response to shocks, there are greater fluctuations in the expected real return on money, which 
in turn drive volatility in the marginal value of holding money, μt. Since this marginal value 
enters into the first-order conditions for bond holdings, this translates into volatility in the 
demand for government debt (see the two middle rows of Figure 3). At relatively low 
indexation shares this volatility remains lower than under inflation targeting. However, this 
volatility rises as the indexation share is increased because the burden of adjustment falls 
increasingly upon the quantity of government debt given that the world real interest rate is 
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exogenous.35 As Figure 3 clearly shows, the volatility of government debt under nominal 
GDP targeting exceeds that under inflation targeting after an indexation share of around 80% 
is reached. As the importance of money holdings is increased by raising θ, this point of 
intersection happens at slightly lower indexation shares, which in turn causes the expected tax 
burden under nominal GDP targeting to be higher than under inflation targeting for a slightly 
wider range of indexation shares, as discussed in Section 5.3. Hence, money and the 
interaction between money and government debt are important for understanding the 
behaviour of the tax burden. Similar conclusions are reached for the case of money in the 
utility function (see Section 5.1).                        
4.3 Discussion and policy implications 
The above results indicate that the share of indexed government debt matters for the tax 
burden and that this relationship is somewhat different under inflation targeting and nominal 
GDP targeting. Accordingly, the indexation shares that minimize the expected tax burden are 
very different – 100% indexed debt under inflation targeting, as compared to around one-
third nominal debt and two-thirds indexed debt under nominal GDP targeting. These results 
are interesting in light of the fact that indexation shares in advanced economies are well 
below 50% (see Campbell et al., 2009 and Footnote 2). It is also of interest that the tax 
burden depends on the demand for money and government debt. In particular, the results 
suggest that the tax burden might vary across countries where currency is a small share of 
GDP (UK, US), and those (Japan, China) where it is relatively more important (Financial 
Times, 2014; Bank of Japan, 2016).  
5 Robustness 
This section considers the robustness of the baseline results to the way that money demand is 
introduced, the specification of the tax burden, and calibration of model parameters. It also 
compares nominal GDP growth targeting with the level-targeting regime of the baseline case. 
5.1 Money in the utility function  
In the baseline model, demand for money was introduced via a requirement that the young 
hold real money balances in proportion to their consumption, as in Artus (1995) and Crettez 
et al. (1999). To test robustness, this section considers the case where money enters into the 
utility function (Sidrauski, 1967). Examples of overlapping generations models which 
introduce money in this way include McCallum (1986) and Nikitin and Russell (2003).    
With this assumption, the maximization problem of a young agent born at date t is now: 
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35 In particular, the total real return on government debt is vr* + (1 – v)Rt-1/Πt.  
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The relative weight on money holdings in the utility function, θm, is set at 0.01 so that real 
money balances are 4% of GDP as in the baseline model. The utility curvature parameter γm  
is set equal to 2, which implies that utility from consumption and utility from real money 
balances have the same curvature.36 All the other parameters are given the same values as in 
the baseline case (see Table 1). The results are very similar to those from the baseline model 
and are reported in full in Section C of the Supplementary Appendix. Figure 4 illustrates this 
similarity by directly comparing the expected tax burden in the two cases. 
 
Fig 4 – Expected tax burden and indexation: baseline case vs money in the utility function.  
Figure plots E[TB] as the share of indexed debt, v, is varied from 0 to 1. 
                                                          
36 Experimentation with values in the range 1.5-2.5 was tried but did not make much difference to the results.   
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Under nominal GDP targeting, the expected tax burden is now minimized at a slightly lower 
indexation share of 68.6% (as compared to 69.4% in the baseline case) and the expected tax 
burden is lower under nominal GDP targeting until an indexation share of 97.0% is reached 
(as compared to 98.4% in the baseline case). This is again driven by the volatility effect: 
taxes become increasingly volatile under nominal GDP targeting as indexation is increased, 
and more so than under inflation targeting at a slightly lower indexation share than in the 
baseline case. This is explained mainly by the fact the government debt volatility now 
overtakes the level under inflation targeting at a lower indexation share than in the baseline 
case. This channel would be absent in the cashless case where θm = 0. All in all, the results 
are robust to the way that demand for money is introduced.  
5.2 Alternative specifications for the tax burden  
The baseline analysis assumes that the tax burden is given by a quadratic loss function for the 
tax rate. As shown by Equation (13), this implies that the terms in mean taxes and tax 
volatility are given equal coefficients in the calculation of the tax burden. This section 
investigates how important this assumption is by using a more general specification for the 
tax burden that allows the weights attached to these terms to vary.  
In particular, consider a period loss function of the form TBt = (τc,t /τc)b, where b ≥ 1 is a 
constant parameter. This general specification nests the baseline specification as a special 
case when b = 2, with deviations from this value changing the relative importance of the 
volatility effect. The expected tax burden is E[TB] = E(τc,t /τc)b, which can be decomposed 
into mean and volatility effects through a second-order approximation around τc,t = E[τc,t]: 
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For b > 2, this specification places a higher relative weight on the variance of taxes than the 
baseline specification and a lower weight on the mean of taxes; to see this, compare Equation 
(19) and Equation (13). Conversely, when b < 2 there is a lower relative weight on the 
variance of taxes and a higher weight on mean taxes. The special case of b = 1 implies that 
mean taxes matter for the tax burden but the variance of taxes does not. To investigate the 
robustness of the baseline conclusions, three different values were considered: b = 2.3,  
b = 1.7 and b = 1.5. The results are reported in Figure 5.  
For all specifications it continues to be the case that issuing both indexed and nominal debt 
minimizes the expected tax burden under nominal GDP targeting, while inflation targeting 
still minimizes the expected tax burden when only indexed debt is issued. In Specification 1, 
where the value of b is increased to 2.3, the tax burden is now minimized at a lower 
indexation share of 57.6% under nominal GDP targeting, because the volatility effect (which 
is smaller at lower indexation shares under nominal GDP targeting) now becomes more 
important relative to the mean effect. For the specifications with b =1.7 and b = 1.5, the 
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indexation share at which the tax burden is minimized rises to 84.8% and 98.2%, 
respectively, because mean taxes are given a higher weight under these specifications, and 
the volatility effect a lower relative weight.  
Hence, the baseline result that the tax burden is minimized at an interior indexation share 
under nominal GDP targeting and a corner solution under inflation targeting is quite robust. It 
should be noted, however, that the burden-minimizing indexation share under nominal GDP 
targeting will eventually become 100% as the value of b is reduced towards 1,37 because this 
reduces the volatility effect sufficiently that the mean effect dominates. By comparison, the 
result that nominal GDP targeting lowers the tax burden relative to inflation targeting (except 
at very high indexation shares) is not so robust.  
 
Fig 5 – Expected tax burden and indexation under alternative specifications of the tax burden. 
Figure plots E[TB] as the share of indexed debt, v, is varied from 0 to 1. 
The specification with b = 2.3 preserves the baseline result because the variance of taxes now 
receives a higher weight than the mean, so that the tax burden under nominal GDP targeting 
is lowered further relative to that under inflation targeting (see first row, Figure 5).  However, 
the results for other two specifications are more interesting. Under Specification 2, the value 
of b is reduced to 1.7. Even this relatively small reduction is sufficient to undo the result that 
the expected tax burden is lower under nominal GDP targeting except at high indexation 
shares (see second row, Figure 5).38 In particular, the expected tax burden starts out being 
lower under inflation targeting, and this continues until an indexation share of around 25%. 
Once the indexation share is increased above this value the baseline result is restored: the 
                                                          
37 Under the baseline calibration, the critical value at which this occurs is b = 1.477.    
38 Under the baseline calibration, the expected tax burden is lowered under nominal GDP targeting (except at 
high indexation shares) provided that b ≥ 1.81. 
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expected tax burden becomes lower under nominal targeting until very high indexation shares 
are reached. Thus, nominal GDP targeting will only lower the expected tax burden relative to 
inflation targeting for quite a limited range of indexation shares in this case.39  
With b = 1.5 we see a more dramatic change: the expected tax burden is lower under inflation 
targeting than nominal GDP targeting for all indexation shares, albeit that the difference is 
very small at indexation shares close to 100%. This happens because there is a sufficiently 
high weight on mean taxes that, under nominal GDP targeting, the higher level of taxes under 
nominal GDP targeting is no compensated for by the reduction in tax volatility. This result 
shows that the impact of nominal GDP targeting on the tax burden will depend crucially on 
the assumed loss function for the tax burden. In particular, nominal GDP targeting will lower 
the expected tax burden relative to inflation targeting (except at high indexation shares) if the 
loss function is quadratic or if it places a similar, or higher, relative weight on tax volatility to 
the quadratic case. Otherwise, the ranking between inflation targeting and nominal GDP 
targeting will be ambiguous – or, if the weight on tax volatility is low enough, inflation 
targeting will lower the expected tax burden relative to nominal GDP targeting.       
5.3 Sensitivity analysis 
5.3.1. Parameter sensitivity analysis 
To investigate robustness, each of the model parameters was assigned a ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
value, as reported in the first column of Table 3. Results were then recomputed, giving a total 
of 22 sets of results for the alternative calibrations. For most cases, the main conclusions are 
remain intact. For instance, as under the baseline calibration, the expected tax burden is 
minimized by issuing only indexed debt under inflation targeting, a result which holds for all 
22 cases. For nominal GDP targeting, there is considerable variation in terms of in the exact 
indexation share at which the expected tax burden is minimized, but this always occurs at an 
interior indexation share (see Table 3, Column 3), as in the baseline analysis. 
In the large majority of the cases, the expected tax burden remains lower under nominal GDP 
targeting than inflation targeting up until very high indexation shares are reached (see Table 
3, final column). However, in 2 of the 22 cases – high risk aversion, high productivity 
persistence40 – there is no clear ranking of the expected tax burden under inflation targeting 
and nominal GDP targeting. Since these results look rather different to the baseline results, 
the relationship between the expected tax burden and the indexation share in each case is 
shown in Figure 6. In both cases the expected tax burden starts out lower under inflation 
targeting, in contrast to the baseline case. The expected tax burden then becomes lower under 
nominal GDP targeting once intermediate indexation shares of less than 30% are reached, 
remaining lower up until indexation shares close to 100%. Thus, although the tax burden 
                                                          
39 A similar result was confirmed for the case of money in the utility function as a further robustness check. 
40 As shown in Table 3, the high risk aversion case sets γ = 2.5 and the high persistence case sets ρA  = 0.70. 
Although these not a big changes relative to the baseline values (2 and 0.5 respectively), they are sufficient to 
cause a significant change in results as discussed below.  
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remains lower under nominal GDP targeting for a majority of indexation shares, the range of 
indexation shares for which this happens is relatively limited compared to the baseline case.  
Table 3 – Parameter sensitivity analysis results 
 
Parameter 
 
 
Value  
{Low, High} 
Indexation share where 
E(TB) NGDP minimized 
{Low, High} 
Indexation share where 
E(TB)NGDP > E(TB)IT 
{Low, High}  
Capital share in output, α  
Private discount factor, β 
Relative risk aversion, γ 
Inverse Frisch elasticity, η 
Cash constraint parameter, θ 
Trend inflation, Π* 
World real interest rate, r* 
Government expenditure, g* 
Productivity persistence, ρA 
Std.(prod. innov.), σe 
Std.(money innov.), σε 
0.27, 0.33 
0.45, 0.85 
1.5, 2.5  
2.5, 3.5 
0.075, 0.125 
1.62, 2.00 
1.6, 2.3 
0.11, 0.17 
0.30, 0.70 
0.04, 0.06 
0.04, 0.06 
70.0%,  68.8% 
68.0%, 70.0 % 
44.0%,  86.4% 
70.6%,  68.4% 
70.2%,  68.6% 
69.4%,  69.4% 
59.6%,  74.6% 
68.6%,  70.0% 
54.2%,  83.2% 
77.2%,  62.4% 
60.8%,  75.8% 
99.2%,  96.6% 
96.6%,  99.0% 
99.8%,  Multiple 
98.6%,  98.4% 
99.0%,  97.8% 
98.2%,  98.6% 
97.2%,  99.2% 
98.4%,  98.6% 
97.6%, Multiple    
99.2%, 98.0% 
98.0%,  99.0%  
Baseline calibration See Table 1 69.4% 98.4% 
 
 
Fig 6 – Expected tax burden: high risk aversion and high productivity persistence calibrations. 
Figure plots E[TB] in each case as the share of indexed debt, v, is varied from 0 to 1. 
High risk aversion matters because this increases the magnitude of the mean effect. 
Specifically, high risk aversion magnifies the difference between the inflation risk premium 
under nominal GDP targeting and that under inflation targeting. As a result, mean taxes under 
nominal GDP targeting rise relative to mean taxes under inflation targeting. For this reason, 
the indexation share that minimizes the expected tax burden increases substantially to 86.4%.  
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High productivity persistence also matters because it makes the mean effect under nominal 
GDP targeting relatively more important. It does so because it implies larger movements in 
labour supply, which affect capital income received by the old via the marginal product of 
capital. This in turn raises inflation risk premium under nominal GDP targeting further, 
which implies an increase in mean taxes with no corresponding reduction in volatility. Hence, 
the expected tax burden is minimized at the somewhat higher indexation share of 83.2%.   
5.3.2 Other robustness tests 
Some further robustness checks are also in order. Firstly, notice from Table 3 that when the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion is reduced to 1.5, there is a very large fall in indexation 
share at which the expected tax burden is minimized under nominal GDP targeting, from 
69% to 44%. If risk aversion is reduced further to log utility, the expected tax burden would 
be minimized at an indexation share of only 2.4% and the expected tax burden is always 
lower under nominal GDP targeting than under inflation targeting. Thus, low levels of risk 
aversion favour nominal debt over indexed debt, and nominal GDP targeting over inflation 
targeting.41 Secondly, the baseline model assumes that money supply shocks are white noise, 
but it was found that relaxing this assumption does not make any substantive difference to the 
results. Third, as noted in Section 4.2, setting θ = 0 so that money is absent makes the 
expected tax burden lower under nominal GDP targeting for all indexation shares below 
100%, with the two regimes giving identical results when only indexed debt is issued. Of 
course, the same results hold θm = 0 under money in the utility function (see Section 5.1). 
Finally, if productivity shocks are absent, the expected tax burden will be minimized by 
issuing only indexed debt under both inflation targeting and nominal GDP targeting, and the 
expected tax burden is higher under nominal GDP targeting for all indexation shares. This 
shows that productivity shocks are crucial in driving the difference in results under inflation 
and nominal GDP targeting. Specifically, it is the presence of productivity shocks that allows 
nominal GDP targeting to reduce tax volatility by making the price level countercyclical, so 
that smaller movements in taxes are necessary to finance government expenditure than under 
inflation targeting where there is no stabilization of taxes in response to productivity shocks. 
5.4 Nominal GDP growth targeting 
The baseline analysis considers nominal GDP level targeting. If we consider nominal GDP 
growth targeting instead, the results are very similar (see Supplementary Appendix D). In 
particular, the expected tax burden is minimized at an indexation share of 70.0%, as 
compared to 69.4% in the baseline case. Moreover, the expected tax burden is lower than 
under inflation targeting unless the indexation share is 97.0% or higher, which compares to 
98.4% in the baseline case. The reason for similar results is that the key difference in the two 
regimes is the response to past deviations from target under a level-targeting regime. Since 
                                                          
41 Similarly, a sufficiently high coefficient of relative risk aversion will favour indexed debt over nominal debt, 
and inflation targeting over nominal GDP targeting.  
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such deviations are part of expected inflation, unanticipated changes in inflation are very 
similar under the two regimes, and there is thus little difference between them in this setting.   
6 Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the impact of nominal GDP targeting on the tax burden using an 
overlapping generations model where monetary policy matters for distortionary taxes. The 
main mechanism in the model is that unanticipated inflation has real wealth effects on 
households who hold nominal government debt. The model was used to assess the tax burden 
under nominal GDP targeting and inflation targeting. It was found that nominal GDP 
targeting makes taxes less volatile than inflation targeting but raises average taxes. With a 
quadratic loss function, the expected tax burden is minimized under inflation targeting by 
issuing only indexed government debt. Nominal GDP targeting lowers the average tax burden 
relative to inflation targeting as it lowers the variance of taxes, and minimization of the tax 
burden requires indexed and nominal debt, in contrast to the case of inflation targeting.  
These conclusions are quite robust within the overlapping generations model studied here. 
However, sensitivity analysis identified three factors which are crucial for the baseline 
results: risk aversion, productivity persistence and the loss function for the tax burden. Both 
high risk aversion and high productivity persistence can overturn the baseline result by 
making the expected tax burden lower under inflation targeting at relatively low indexation 
shares. On the other hand, the form of the loss function matters because, relative to inflation 
targeting, nominal GDP targeting move mean taxes and tax volatility in opposite directions. 
Overall, the results suggest that inflation targeting and nominal GDP targeting could have 
quite different implications for the tax burden, and that the impact will depend crucially on 
the share of indexed government debt. 
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Appendix 
The inflation risk premium and monetary policy 
This Appendix shows that the difference in expected real returns on nominal and indexed 
bonds can be interpreted as an inflation risk premium, and discusses how this premium 
relates to monetary policy and the share of indexed debt.  
Letting
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The expression in Equation (A3) can be interpreted as an inflation risk premium because, in 
general, it is non-zero unless inflation risk is equal to zero. The numerical analysis in the 
paper focuses on the unconditional expectation of Equation (A3).  
Using the same steps as above, but taking the unconditional expectation of (A1) and (A2) and 
dropping time subscripts for ease of interpretation, we have: 
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where cv[x] denotes the coefficient of variation of x, and std[x] is the standard deviation of x. 
Monetary policy directly affects the correlation and standard deviation terms in (A4) through 
the real return on nominal debt, rn = R/Π. The correlation term is negative under calibrations 
in this paper whenever some nominal debt is held, since an unanticipated inflation lowers the 
consumption of the old and the taxes that they face, raising marginal utility. The correlation 
falls in absolute value as the share of indexed debt rises because household portfolios (and 
the taxes they face) are less vulnerable to inflation risk as more inflation-indexed debt is held. 
Under inflation targeting, the correlation is equal to zero when only indexed debt is held 
because this ensures that no part of the real wealth of the old is influenced by unanticipated 
inflation. By contrast, the correlation remains negative under nominal GDP targeting, so the 
inflation risk premium is positive even if only indexed debt is held (see Figure 3, bottom 
row). The reason is that monetary policy responds to negative productivity shocks with 
unanticipated inflation, so that inflation negatively covaries with the return on capital. This 
covariance between inflation and marginal utility is present even if no nominal debt is held.     
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Supplementary Appendix (For online publication only) 
Section A – The binding legal constraint on money holdings 
It is shown in this section that the constraint on real money holdings binds with strict equality 
if the gross money return on a nominal bonds exceeds 1.  
Proposition: The constraint binds with strict equality when Rt > 1 
Proof. 
By equations (6) and (8), the Lagrange multiplier on the cash constraint is given by 
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Since the real return on nominal bonds is mttttnt rRRr ,11,1 /   , we can also write 
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since the nominal yield on nominal government bonds, Rt, is known at the end of period t. 
 The Kuhn-Tucker conditions associated with μt are as follows: 
    0))1((      and      0 ,1,  ttcttt cm                                       (A3)             
The second condition in (A3) is the complementary slackness condition. It implies that the 
cash constraint will bind iff μt > 0 for all t. By (A2), this holds if Rt > 1for all t.  Q.E.D. 
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Section B – Impulse responses under the baseline calibration 
B1 – Impulse responses to a money supply innovation under inflation targeting (IT) and 
nominal GDP targeting (NGDP) 
 
Figure B1 – Impulse responses to a monetary innovation under inflation and nominal GDP targeting.  
NB. When only one line is visible this indicates that the IRFs are essentially identical under both regimes. 
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Figure B2 – Impulse responses to a productivity innovation under inflation and nominal GDP targeting. 
NB. When only one line is visible this indicates that the IRFs are essentially identical under both regimes. 
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Section C – Results under money in the utility function 
The relative weight on money holdings, θm, is set at 0.01 so that real money balances are 4% 
of GDP as in the baseline model. The utility curvature parameter γm  is set equal to 1.5. 
 
 
Fig C1 – Expected tax burden and indexation (MIUF). Figure plots E[TB] as the share of indexed debt, v, is 
varied from 0 to 1. The steady state value is identical under both regimes and does not vary with the share of 
indexed debt. MIUF denotes ‘money in the utility function’. 
 
Fig C2 – Decomposition of expected tax burden into mean and volatility effect (MIUF). Figure plots the 
mean effect and the volatility effect as the share of indexed debt is varied from 0 to 1. The sum of the mean and 
volatility effects equals expected tax burden plotted in Fig C1. MIUF denotes ‘money in the utility function’. 
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Fig C3 – Real variables and indexation (MIUF). Figure plots the unconditional moments of variables under 
inflation targeting and nominal GDP targeting as the share of indexed debt is varied from 0 to 1. MIUF denotes 
‘money in the utility function’. 
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Section D – Nominal GDP growth targeting vs nominal GDP level targeting 
Since ‘bygones are bygones’ under a nominal GDP growth targeting regime, the nominal 
money supply evolves according to the following rule: 
)exp()/( 1
*
1 tttttt mmMM                                                                                 (D1) 
As under level targeting, the desired inflation rate is Π*yt-1/ yt, . Hence, inflation under 
nominal GDP growth targeting is given by 
   )exp(]/[* 1
,
ttt
GRNGDP
t yy                                                   (D2) 
The figures below present results for this case under the baseline calibration (see Section 4.1). 
 
Fig D1 – Expected tax burden and indexation. Figure plots E[TB] as the share of indexed debt, v, is varied 
from 0 to 1. The steady state is identical under both regimes and does not vary with the share of indexed debt.  
 
Fig D2 – Decomposition of expected tax burden into mean and volatility effect.  Figure plots the mean 
effect and the volatility effect as the share of indexed debt is varied from 0 to 1.  
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Fig D3 – Real variables and indexation. Figure plots the unconditional moments of variables under nominal 
GDP targeting and nominal GDP growth targeting as the share of indexed debt is varied from 0 to 1. 
 
